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Abstract: 
 
Unequal turnout, namely that educated citizens are more likely to vote, has been a long-
standing pre-occupation of scholars of political participation and has been shown to exist across 
established democracies in varying degrees. Using pooled cross-sectional individual level data 
covering the period from 1990 to 2007 across 12 post-communist new democracies, this paper 
examines the applicability of existing explanations for unequal turnout in the Eastern European 
context. The paper shows that while voting procedures explain some cross-national variation 
in unequal turnout, turnout inequality is likewise shaped over time by processes related to the 
transition from communism, primarily the fading of initial excitement with democratic 
elections. The mechanism of learning among mature voters rather than generational 
replacement dominates the latter process.  
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In a democracy every citizen should, ideally, have the right to vote and thus have equal 
political influence. In practice, citizens’ influence through elections is hardly equal: wealthier, 
better educated voters are more likely to vote than the disadvantaged; Lijphart terms this pattern 
“unequal turnout” (1997). Turnout inequality has naturally received much attention from 
scholars of democratic political participation (Verba et al. 1995, Brady et al. 1995; Schlozman 
et al. 2012; Gallego 2008, 2010; Leighley and Nagler 2013) and its implications for unequal 
political influence are repeatedly noted (Mahler 2008).   
Recent efforts to explain the cross-national variation in turnout inequality have focused 
on the importance of the national institutional context; turnout inequality is almost non-existent 
in countries with compulsory voting and highest in countries, such as the USA, where onerous 
registration rules discourage disadvantaged voters (Gallego 2010). These explanations, 
however, assume a relatively stable institutional and micro-level social context, and thus are 
unsuited to capturing the dynamic nature of new democracies. A cross-sectional approach may 
work for established democracies that are in a stable equilibrium (Gray and Caul 2000); 
however the Eastern European new democracies have been in a state of flux since the collapse 
of communism. We already know that turnout in post-communist countries has declined over 
time (Kostadinova 2003; Kostadinvoa and Power 2007) indicating that strong temporal 
mechanisms are at work. Recent studies that apply theories of socialization and political 
learning to the post-communist context attest to the dynamic nature of these societies  including 
the fading of communist legacies as well as the effects of new experiences during the transitions  
(Mishler and Rose 2007; Neundorf 2010; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014). Unequal turnout in 
post-communist countries must thus be analysed not just cross-sectionally but across time, and 
particular attention must be given not only to how the context changes but also how the 
electorate itself is changing both through generational replacement and learning. 
  This paper firstly complements Aina Gallego’s (2010) paper on unequal turnout in 
established democracies by extending her analysis to Eastern Europe. Thus far no studies have 
systematically explained turnout inequality in the context of Eastern European new 
democracies; thus goal of this paper is to assess the current explanations against new ones that 
specifically apply to these new democracies. The new explanations considered in this paper are 
(a) the fading of the excitement with democratic elections and (b) the fading effects of 
compulsory participation in communist elections. Both explanations incorporate the legacies 
of past regimes and the transitional period itself. 
The second part of the analysis compares the older (pre-Cold War and Cold War) and 
post-Cold War generations weighing the evidence in favour of the two possible dynamic 
explanations of turnout inequality: the fading of the initial excitement with democracy driven 
through learning and the replacement of older generations socialized when voting was 
compulsory under communism. The findings indicate that learning among the older 
generations primarily contributed to the increase in turnout inequality, while the replacement 
of the older generations by the post-Cold War post-transition cohorts made a small 
contribution. 
I begin this paper with an overview of the various potential explanations of turnout 
inequality; both those found to apply in established democracies as well as explanations that 
incorporate the transitional nature of the post-communist context. I use pooled survey data from 
four large mass surveys to maximize cross-sectional and temporal coverage. In this paper I 
argue that turnout inequality in Eastern Europe can be partially explained by electoral 
institutions (ballot complexity specifically) as in established democracies, but institutional 
explanations fail to explain why turnout inequality increased with time. While some 
replacement of mature post-communist voters by younger cohorts, which neither experienced 
the habit-forming effects of compulsory voting under communism nor the excitement of the 
transition, has occurred, the increasing turnout inequality appears to be primarily caused by 
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behavioural change among the older voters. The once excited older voters appear to be 
accepting democratic elections as a more routine process. 
 
Fading euphoria and the end of forced voting  
The two main studies, which examine the decline in turnout in post-communist countries, 
attribute the decline to the natural waning of excitement at the first democratic elections 
(Kostadinova 2003; Kostadinova and Power 2007). The idea that founding elections are 
somehow unique was most notably put forward by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) who 
observed, based on several case studies of regime change in Latin America, that the first post-
authoritarian elections are a time of euphoria and unusually high levels of interest in politics 
during which people believe they can shape political outcomes; however, once the new political 
rules are in place, the excitement wears off. Increasing turnout inequality is part of this 
‘normalization’ process as the disadvantaged voters who are most sensitive to the costs of 
voting drop out of the electorate. 
The founding elections euphoria effect can be understood as being comprised of two 
components: the high salience of the first election (Fornos 2004) and high hopes for democracy 
(Hughes and Guerrero 2009). Arguably the first elections are the most salient elections possible 
in a democracy as they determine the constitutions and institutions of a new democratic regime. 
Numerous studies show that voters become mobilized when they perceive the electoral stakes 
to be high and they believe that individual votes make a difference (Pacek et al. 2009). 
Secondly, the founding elections, as well as some of the subsequent elections, are characterized 
by high hopes for what democracy can deliver in terms of policy; with each passing election 
voters learn that democracy is not a panacea for all problems and they adjust their expectations 
accordingly, becoming less engaged (Hutcheson 2004; Mason 2004; Ingelhart and Cattelberg 
2002). Thus, founding elections in new democracies are characterized by unusually high 
turnout which then declines over time with each subsequent election (Roussias 2012).   
The ‘founding elections’ or ‘euphoria’ effect, as it is often referred to, is not explored 
theoretically in much depth. Its effect is largely based on the assumption that the first 
democratic elections after a long period of authoritarianism will cause excitement and voter 
mobilization. This assumption is further substantiated by the presumed high salience of the 
first elections and arguments about the high stakes involved. However, both these justifications 
would imply a relatively short-lived surge in electoral turnout, and a readjustment could be 
expected to occur even in the second democratic election.  
Alternatively, the ‘founding elections’ or ‘euphoria’ effect can be understood in a 
broader manner to include mobilization of the popular opposition leading up to the regime 
collapse. Descriptions of the protest cycles leading up to the collapse of the communist regimes 
show a build-up of protest participation (of varying speeds) culminating in protest events that 
included up to three quarters of the population (i.e. the November strike in Czechoslovakia) 
(Glenn 2003; Rucht 2003; Ekiert and Kubik 1998; Ulfelder 2004). The duration of the protest 
cycles implies a general level of political mobilization that began earlier than the actual first 
democratic elections and which could imply a certain momentum that could take time to 
dissipate. The prolonged nature of opposition mobilization could allow for both updating/re-
learning effects among mature citizens as well as socialization effects on the transition cohorts. 
The core theoretical principle underlying the ‘founding elections’ explanation is the 
idea that voting behaviour progresses towards more ‘normal’ patterns as democracy becomes 
routinized. As shown already by several studies, aggregate turnout has declined in post-
communist new democracies in keeping with the ‘founding elections’ explanation 
(Kostadinova 2003; Kostadinova and Power 2007; Roussias 2012). While it may still be early 
to see, aggregate turnout should plateau at levels appropriate to the institutions in given 
countries. At the micro-level, we expect the ‘normalization’ of turnout to be characterized by 
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a turnout decline concentrated among people who are most sensitive to the costs of voting, in 
particular people of low socioeconomic status; as the ‘founding elections’ effect dissipates, the 
perceived benefits of voting decline relative to the costs, resulting in an increasing turnout gap 
between high and low status voters.  
The elements of socioeconomic status (income, education, and social class) serve as 
proxies for political engagement and sensitivity to the cost of voting. Verba et al. (1995: 358) 
find that socioeconomic status, especially education, primarily contributes indirectly to voting; 
socioeconomic status shapes the ‘civic orientations’ or ‘psychological engagement in politics’ 
such as interest, political efficacy, and civic skills (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995). 
Educated voters are more likely to vote because they possess more cognitive resources, making 
the costs of navigating voting procedures and making electoral choices easier to bear. Also 
educated individuals are more likely to vote because of the ‘sorting’ effects of the education 
system; they are more likely to be socialized among equally educated individuals who are 
interested in politics and to remain embedded in politically active social networks (Abrams, 
Iversen and Soskice 2010; Rolfe 2012). Verba et al. (1995: 358) find that accounting for 
‘psychological engagement’ in politics in a regression model with the determinants of voting 
almost eliminates the effects measured for socioeconomic status. Political engagement as well 
as the social environment of politically engaged people allow for easier acquisition of political 
information and help reduce sensitivity to costs of voting.  
During the extraordinary times of the ‘founding elections’ when populations are 
unusually mobilized, ‘normal’ variation in voting participation along the lines of 
socioeconomic status should be suppressed reflecting the higher perceived benefits and lower 
costs of voting. During the exciting times of the first democratic elections, people are more 
likely to discuss politics and political parties make a greater effort to mobilize voters so political 
information is ‘cheaper.’  Individuals who normally would not be interested in politics, such 
as the poor and the uneducated, will be mobilized to a similar degree as educated voters who 
normally maintain an interest in politics. Furthermore, the high salience of the ‘founding 
elections’, as well as the high hopes and expectations for the new democratic regime counteract 
the costs of voting for low socioeconomic status voters by raising the perceived benefits of 
voting. As the initial euphoria of the ‘founding elections’ wanes, interest in politics should 
return to more normal levels: high status individuals who are less sensitive to voting costs will 
maintain their interest in politics and will continue to vote at high levels, but interest in politics 
and voting participation among the disadvantaged should drop with time to more ‘normal’ 
levels. 
 There is an alternative factor that could also produce a pattern of increasing turnout 
inequality over time: the fading of the effects of forced participation in communist elections. 
Although officially there was no legal requirement to vote, participation in elections by all 
citizens over the age of 18 was expected by the communist authorities. Voting under 
communism had a specific and rather important function: the legitimation of the communist 
regime (Sakwa and Crouch 1978) or, counter-intuitively as some argue, a demonstration of the 
mass acceptance of the regime as it actually was (e.g. a fictitious democracy) (Zaslavsky and 
Brym 1978). Either way, to fulfil these functions, voting had to have the semblance of a 
voluntary action or, even more likely, of a submission to the system.   
The communist regimes achieved the incredible turnout figures generally not through 
outright falsification but thanks to the incredibly powerful mobilization campaigns (Furtak 
1990: 36-38; Zaslavsky and Brym 1978; Birch 2009). The regimes would nominate ‘agitators’ 
who were responsible for cajoling voters into showing up to vote; in the Soviet Union there 
was one agitator for every 15-20 voters (Karklins 1986; Furtak 1990). These agitators 
themselves would face sanctions if their designated voters did not vote. If someone did not turn 
up at the electoral station, the agitators would come and knock on the person’s door. Every 
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effort was made to make voting easy; ballot boxes would be brought to the homes of elderly or 
ill persons (Furtak 1990). Whereas those who did not vote would face a variety of sanctions: 
usually the denial of professional promotions or expulsion from university (Birch 2009; 
Zaslavsky and Brym 1978). Electoral avoidance would have taken far more effort than simply 
voting. The reasons behind the majority of electoral avoidance are disputed - some arguing that 
it was a form of political dissent (Karklins 1986) and others that the main reason was to have 
a peaceful Sunday afternoon (Furtak 1990) - but either way it would have been relatively low. 
Outside the Soviet Union, the methods and sanctions would have been milder, but would still 
have followed the same principles. 
The perceived meaningless of these elections is probably the principal reason why the 
habit-forming effects of communist elections have not been considered (Kostelka 2014); 
instead emphasis has been on the newly found ‘right to not participate’ after the collapse of 
communism (Rose et al. 2001). Given the incredible level of the communist mobilization 
campaigns, some habit-forming effect should not be dismissed. The possibility that 
longitudinal turnout patterns have been shaped by the end of the de facto communist 
compulsory voting regime would be a parsimonious explanation, and it would accord well with 
explanations of long-term changes in turnout in established democracies, which emphasize 
habit-formation and change through generational replacement (Franklin 2004). If forced 
participation in communist elections did have a habit-forming effect which would persist in 
democratic elections, then turnout would be boosted among the cohorts which came of age 
under communism thus lowering turnout inequality; an increase over time in turnout inequality 
would occur as the older generations are replaced by the post-transition cohorts, which came 
of age too late to experience forced electoral participation.  
 
Party Supply: Too few or too many choices 
For citizens to be able to indicate their preferences through elections effectively there must be 
a balanced supply of electoral choices. A sufficient number of electoral choices must be 
available for voters to have real alternatives to choose from. In established democracies the 
convergence of parties towards the political centre, or ‘de-polarization,’ has contributed to 
electoral fatigue (Schmitt and Friere 2012). On the other hand, too many choices and choices 
that are too radically different from one another also present problems for the quality of 
electoral democracy (Sartori 1976).  
 While party supply in moderation has a positive effect on the quality of democracy, not 
all voters benefit equally from greater party supply: party supply mobilizes turnout among 
sophisticated voters but depresses turnout among uninformed and inefficacious voters 
(Kittilson and Anderson 2012; Jusko and Shiveley 2005; Karp and Banducci 2007, 2008). 
Kittilson and Anderson (2012) find that highly efficacious voters, who believe that their vote 
matters, are far more likely to vote when there are more parties to choose from and the parties 
are more polarized, representing greater choice on issue dimensions; these voters are easily 
able to bear the costs of making electoral choices, so the additional complexity of electoral 
choices does not dissuade them. Disadvantaged voters on the other hand, who already bear the 
costs of voting with difficulty, become discouraged as party supply increases. We expect that 
party supply will, therefore, influence the degree of turnout inequality. When party supply is 
high, the gap in turnout between advantaged and disadvantaged voters will be greater. 
 The implications of party supply for turnout are particularly relevant in the post-
communist context where the party systems have been in the process of evolving. The supply 
of new parties, driven by impatient elites, has forced voters to constantly switch from party to 
party (Tavits 2008). The constant supply of new parties in Eastern European elections inhibits 
the formation of party identification thus making voting costly for disadvantaged voters. On 
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the other hand, as party systems consolidate in some countries and party supply declines, 
ideologically committed voters are likely to lose interest in voting (Roussias 2012).  
 
The strength of the left: organizational mobilization of the poor 
The resource explanations of political participation suggest that disadvantaged citizens are less 
likely to vote than advantaged citizens, since they lack the motivation and interest in the 
election as well as the cognitive resources needed to navigate the electoral process (Brady et 
al. 1995; Verba et al. 1995). Mobilization efforts on the part of political and social 
organizations targeted at low socioeconomic status can counteract turnout inequality, as 
organizations themselves can serve as a resource for disadvantaged citizens (Gallego 2010, 
Verba et al 1978).  
 In established democracies two forms of organizations have been identified as sources 
of mobilization for low socioeconomic status voters: left parties and trade unions (Gallego 
2010). Historically, left parties, such as the socialist, social democratic, and communist parties, 
provided the backbone of workers’ movements in European democracies throughout the 20th 
century (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). These parties explicitly addressed the concerns of the 
working class electorate thus providing additional incentives for working class voters to 
participate in elections.  
 Trade unions provide the second source of mobilization for low socioeconomic status 
voters (Nagler and Leighley 2007). Trade unions provide informational support for members 
as well as wider mobilization of people with similar interests to members through assistance in 
political campaigns. Unsurprisingly, trade union members tend to be more likely to vote 
(Delaney, Masters, and Schwochau 1988; Leighley and Nagler 1992a; Radcliff 2000, 2001; 
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). The decline in turnout in established democracies has been 
attributed to a weakening of the traditional link between trade union movement and left parties 
(Gray and Caul 2000) and a shift in emphasis by trade unions away from the working class 
towards the middle class (Nagler and Leighley 2007).  
 One could object that trade union membership may have a different meaning in post-
communist new democracies, owing to the legacy of compulsory membership under 
communism. However, this legacy seems to have a lasting socialization effect of actually 
encouraging organization and political participation (Letki 2004). According to Letki, past 
membership in non-democratic organizations actually predicts political participation under the 
new democratic regimes. Trade union membership has the same or even a slightly more 
positive effect on encouraging voter participation in Eastern Europe compared to Western 
Europe (Bernhagen and Marsh 2006). Overall, we would expect that strong left parties, which 
receive a considerable share of the vote, and extensive trade union membership will counteract 
socioeconomic bias in turnout by encouraging people of low socioeconomic status to vote. 
 
Income Inequality: economic disengagement among transitions’ losers 
Income inequality appears to reinforce feelings of relative powerlessness among disadvantaged 
voters, discouraging them from participation in elections (Solt 2008, 2010; Anderson and 
Beramendi 2008). According to the relative power argument, poor voters assess their general 
abilities to influence policy outcomes in relation to wealthier co-citizens, and if the relative 
power differentials are too great and income inequality is high, poor voters will deem voting 
as ineffectual and pointless (Goodin and Dryzek 1980). Examining the effects of income 
inequality on turnout among disadvantaged voters in post-communist countries is particularly 
relevant as several of these countries experienced dramatic increases in income inequality as 
they transitioned to market economies. The growth in income inequality in these countries is a 
reflection of differing abilities of socioeconomic groups to compete in market economies, 
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particularly in terms of education; the wages of highly educated people, especially 
professionals, outpaced those of the less educated in manufacturing and agricultural sectors.  
 We would expect that unequal success in the new market economies has caused 
political disillusionment among the economic losers resulting in more unequal turnout in 
countries with high income inequality. In post-communist countries, people are more likely to 
vote if they are employed (White and McAllister 2004); and more generally people with 
positive economic evaluations are more positively disposed to the new democratic regimes in 
Eastern Europe (Kluegel and Mason 2004, Neundorf 2010, Evans and Whitefield 1995).  
 
Election procedures and costs of voting 
Last but not least, electoral procedures are possibly the main determinants of turnout inequality: 
to put it simply, turnout inequality is lower where voting is easier. The fine balance between 
the costs and benefits of voting means that even small changes tip the balance for and against 
voting (Blais 2000, Tingsten 1937). The more complicated the electoral procedures are, the 
more difficult voting becomes for unmotivated voters with few cognitive resources. Each 
additional complication quickly tips the balance against the benefits of voting, whether it is 
complex registration procedures or complicated choices on the preferential ballots. For this 
reason, compulsory voting, which raises the costs of not voting by imposing sanctions, almost 
eliminates turnout inequality (Lijphart 1997; Gallego 2010). Also, state-initiated voter 
registration, in contrast to the onerous voter registration in the US, reduces turnout inequality 
by reducing the informational costs and effort of getting to the polling booth.  
 Finally, the complexity of the ballots themselves and how many choices they require 
the voter to make has an influence on turnout inequality. Simple ballots that present the voter 
with only one choice, such as in majoritarian systems where the voter has to choose only 
between a handful of candidates or closed list PR systems, impose minimal cognitive costs of 
voting and thus do not deter uninformed voters. On the other hand complex ballots, which 
allow voters to choose both the party and the candidate, encourage informed and highly 
motivated voters by giving them the opportunity to send a more nuanced political message, 
while confusing and discouraging the less informed voters (Anduiza 2002, Gallego 2010). 
 For post-communist Eastern Europe only, ballot type may be relevant in explaining 
turnout inequality as none of these countries currently has compulsory voting and all have state-
initiated voter registration. Eastern European countries have a variety of electoral systems 
ranging from simple closed list PR in Moldova; mixed proportional representation and 
majoritarian systems in Russia (until 2005); to open list proportional representation with 
preferential voting in Latvia. We would expect that turnout inequality will be lower where 
voting involves fewer choices, such as in the countries with simple closed list proportional 
representation systems, and higher where preferential voting imposes complex choices on the 
voter. 
 
Data, Variables, and Method 
To maximize temporal and cross-sectional coverage, data is pooled from four different data 
sources: a collection of cross-sectional national stratified random sample surveys covering the 
period from 1991 to 2008 conducted as part of UK ESRC and EU Science Foundation funded 
projects run by Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield from 1992 to 2009 (hereafter referred 
to as the EurEqual survey); the European Social Survey Rounds 1 to 4 (ESS); the Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 (CSES); and Waves 1 and 2 of the study ‘Consolidation 
of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe’ (CDCEE). The dataset covers 45 elections across 
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12 post-communist countries with at least 2 elections covered in each.1  At least 900 individuals 
were surveyed for each election, so in total the entire dataset includes a sample size of about 
98,000 individuals. 
 While the models are estimated with turnout as the dependent variable, the quantity of 
interest is turnout inequality. I focus on operationalizing turnout inequality along the dimension 
of education. Education is arguably most central to the creation of inequalities in voting 
participation by serving as the primary social sorting mechanism segregating people into 
networks that share not only political attitudes but also economic status. Unsurprisingly, of the 
three indicators of socioeconomic status, education appears to be most closely and consistently 
linked to voter participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Blais 2000, 2006), and post-
communist countries are no exception to the strong effects of education on voter turnout 
(Bernhagen and Marsh 2006; Kostelka 2014). Finally, education is not disaggregated by 
accounting for political attitudes, which are themselves closely associated with education, 
because from the normative point of view turnout inequality matters in the sense of an overall 
unequal representation of education groups. Education is measured as a three category variable: 
1-Primary, 2-Secondary, and 3-Tertiary. The estimated strength of the treatment effect of 
education on turnout is treated as the measure of turnout inequality. 
 Trade union membership (member -1, non-member - 0) is added at the micro-level as 
one of the components of left strength. Finally, only age and age squared are included as 
controls at the individual level so as not to further disaggregate the effect of education, 
particularly as education has indirect effects. 
 To capture the passing of the ‘founding elections’ euphoria some measure of time is 
needed. To allow for cross-national comparability, all the data is clustered according to election 
sequence rather than using the years in which the elections occur. For example, all the first 
‘founding elections’ would be coded 1 regardless of the actual year of occurrence (i.e. Poland 
1989 and Russia 1990). The dataset covers most of the elections between the second and sixth 
elections since the collapse of communism for all the countries in the study.2  Also, all the 
surveys for each country that occur in the same electoral cycle are clustered together to cover 
the preceding election (i.e. all surveys done between the 1993 and 1995 elections for the 
Russian Duma are used to cover the 1993 election). 
 Party supply is measured using two indicators: the effective number of electoral parties 
and polarization. The effective number of electoral parties, which is calculated using Laakso 
and Taghepera’s index (1979), is taken from the dataset kindly provided by Kostadinova and 
Power (2007) and is supplemented by the Database of Political Institutions as well as by a 
dataset of election indices created by Michael Gallagher (Gallagher and Mitchell 2003). 
Polarization is measured using the RILE index of parties left-right positions from the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Klingemann et al 2006), and is calculated using 
Dalton‘s (2008) formula for polarization.3  
 Left party strength is measured as the left parties’ share of the total vote. Left parties 
are identified using a scale measuring party position on the economic dimension based on the 
CMP analysis of party manifesto positions relating to particular issues concerning the 
                                                             
1 The database consists of the following legislative elections: Bulgaria (1991, 1997, 2005) Czech Republic 
(1992, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2006) Estonia (1992, 1995, 1999, 2003) Hungary (1998, 2002, 2006) Latvia (1995, 
2006) Lithuania (1992, 1996, 2000, 2008) Moldova (1994, 2005) Poland (1993, 1997, 2001, 2005) Romania 
(1992, 1996, 2004, 2008) Russia (1993, 1999, 2003, 2007) Slovakia (1994, 1998, 2002, 2006) Ukraine (1994, 
1998, 2002, 2006, 2007). I include Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova despite these countries being considered 
undemocratic, since I agree with Joshua Tucker’s argument in Regional Economic Voting (2006) that we have 
much to learn by comparing these countries with the rest of Eastern Europe. 
2 Unfortunately owing to the lack of a sufficient number of countries being covered, I have been unable to 
include the first founding elections in the analysis. 
3 PI = SQRT{Σ(party vote sharei)*([party L/R scorei – party system average L/R score]/5)2} 
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economic and welfare policy (see Tavits and Letki 2009 for a discussion of this measure of 
party position).4 Parties left of the party system, which centre on the economic dimension in 
each election within each country, are classified as left parties. I focus on identifying left parties 
based on their positions on the economic dimension based on the assumption that parties’ stated 
position on economic and welfare policy is most relevant for mobilizing poor and working-
class voters. Furthermore, left parties are identified by their position on the left-right scale 
rather than party family since the traditional left party families do not capture all the parties 
that fall left of the centre.  
 Income inequality is measured as inequality in net income, post-tax and post-transfer. 
The gini coefficient measure of net income inequality is obtained from the Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database (SWIID) compiled by Frederick Solt (2009). 
 Finally, ballot complexity is measured as a three-category variable coded 1 for the 
simplest electoral systems (closed list PR), 2 for mixed systems, 3 for open list PR. 
 A multilevel model is used in the regression analysis so as to account for variation 
across elections within countries as well as country effects. Not accounting for the clustering 
of the data would violate the assumption of independent standard errors and would 
underestimate the errors for the contextual effects. The model has three levels: individual, 
election, and country. Random intercepts are included at the two higher levels, but no random 
slopes as there are too few higher-level cases. I have decided it is more important to account 
for clustering within countries rather than include random slopes at the second level. Trade 
union membership is included as an individual level variable. The model is shown below in 
reduced form: 
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳 (𝑽𝑽𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑽𝑽𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊) = 𝜸𝜸𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎 + 𝜸𝜸𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜸𝜸 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝑪𝑪𝑳𝑳𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝑽𝑽𝑪𝑪𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜸𝜸 𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝑪𝑪𝑳𝑳𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝑽𝑽𝑪𝑪𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊+ 𝜸𝜸𝟐𝟐𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝑨𝑨𝑳𝑳𝑽𝑽𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜸𝜸𝟑𝟑𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝑨𝑨𝑳𝑳𝑽𝑽𝟐𝟐𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜸𝜸𝟒𝟒𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑽𝑽𝑻𝑻𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝑻𝑻𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝒊𝒊 + 𝑻𝑻𝟎𝟎𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 
 
Estimating turnout inequality 
As discussed earlier, turnout inequality is measured as the size of the coefficient for education. 
For descriptive purposes, I estimate turnout inequality across country-elections by running logit 
regressions for each cluster. Sticking with Gallego’s (2010) simple model of turnout at the 
individual level, the regressions are estimated accounting only for age and age squared at the 
individual level. 
 While the logit coefficients for education do not show the substantive effects of 
education on turnout, they show the overall strength of the relationship between education and 
turnout; the coefficient serves as an approximation of its association with turnout. Where the 
coefficients are close to zero, turnout inequality would be practically non-existent. Education 
influences turnout indirectly through various mechanisms such as political engagement (Verba 
et al. 1995), so controls for these other factors are not included in order to capture the overall 
effect. For normative concerns about equality of representation, the overall effect is of most 
interest. 
                                                             
4 Items included from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Klingemann et al 2006) to form economic dimension 
scale: Party economic left-right score =Right wing(Liberal, Reformist) – Left Wing (Socialist, Anti-reformist) = 
(per401 Free enterprise positive + per 402 Incentives Positive +per407 Protectionism Negative +per409 
Keynesian Demand Management: Positive +per410 Productivity Positive + per505 Welfare state limitation 
positive + per507 Education limitation positive +per4011 Privatization positive +per4012 Control of economy 
negative +per4013 Property-restitution positive) – (per403 Market Regulation Positive +per404 Economic 
Planning positive  +per406 Protectionism Positive+ per412 Controlled Economy Positive +per413 
Nationalization Positive +per503 Social Justice Positive +per504 Welfare State Expansion Positive +per506 
Education Expansion Positive +per4123 Publicly Owned Industry Positive  +per4124 Socialist Property Positive 
+ per4131 Property-Restitution Negative +per4132 Privatization Negative ) 
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 In general, some degree of turnout inequality along the dimension of education exists 
in all the Eastern European countries included in this study as illustrated by Figure 1. Nowhere 
is the relationship between education and turnout negative, which means that the university-
educated are more likely to vote than the uneducated in all the countries considered. Turnout 
inequality is weakest in Moldova in the second election and in Ukraine in the third election, 
but even in these instances education has a slight positive effect. The finding that turnout 
inequality exists in all these countries to a greater or lesser extent is unsurprising given that 
none of these countries currently has compulsory voting. Compulsory voting is by far the 
strongest institutional determinant of turnout (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, Jackman 1987, 
Norris 2002), and it is the primary institutional feature, which almost eliminates turnout 
inequality (Lijphart 1997, Gallego 2010). Also, all post-communist new democracies have 
state-initiated voter registration, the lack of which is the other main cause of turnout inequality 
(Lijphart 1997, Gallego 2010; although see Calvert and Gilchrist 1993: 699; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980), so although the levels of turnout inequality are quite varied in Eastern 
Europe, registration procedures do not play as strong a role as they do in a wider pool of cases. 
In the absence of these two main institutional explanatory factors, we have to cast our nets 
wider to explain variations in turnout inequality in the post-communist context.  
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 The need to consider temporal dynamics is reinforced by the clear variation in turnout 
inequality over time, particularly the visible upward trend in several countries shown in Figure 
2. Figure 2 shows overall turnout and the turnout inequality by election sequence. Turnout 
inequality remains relatively stable in only two countries: Poland and Bulgaria. In the 
remaining countries turnout inequality changes considerably over time. Just over half of the 
countries reveal a pattern in turnout and turnout inequality that seems to fit with both of the 
proposed dynamic explanations (fading euphoria or fading effects of compulsory voting): 
turnout declines while turnout inequality increases. The pervasive pattern of turnout decline 
would appear to fit with prior studies that argue that voting participation declined in Eastern 
Europe as the initial excitement with democratic elections faded away (Kostadinova 2003; 
Kostadinova and Power 2007), however one should note the variation in the starting levels of 
turnout in earliest elections. High initial turnout is not present in all the countries, suggesting 
other factors at play such as the varying intensity of popular mobilization leading up to the 
regime collapses, as well as the decision to stop enforcing electoral participation by communist 
authorities, most notably in Poland and Hungary. Further analysis of these changes within 
generations is required to adjudicate between the two explanations. 
 
Regression Results 
Table 1 shows the results of a hierarchical three-level random slopes logit regression.5 The 
second level consists of elections, which in turn are nested within countries at the third level. 
                                                             
5 Robustness checks: Several additional analyses to ensure the stability of the interaction coefficients. Also I 
have run individual models for each of the explanatory variables with an interaction with education, as well as 
one single model with all the explanatory variables and interactions between each of these variables and 
education included following Gallego’s (2010) example. The directions of the interaction effects remain stable 
across all the different models.  
Finally, as the number of higher level cases is relatively small, I conduct a two-stage analysis to allow for the 
detection of any influential outliers at second level. I use the estimated coefficients for education for the 
second-level units to identify any influential outliers by examining scatterplots of turnout inequality against 
each of the explanatory factors as well as the leverage of each level two unit. Finally I ran several regressions 
for the second stage eliminating one country at a time. In the following analysis I discuss how particular higher 
level cases influence the results.  
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Covering several elections within countries allows turnout inequality to be examined both 
across countries and across time. All the explanatory variables, even ballot complexity, have 
changed over time, so the structure of the data allows us to account for the impact of these 
changes. Time, which is necessary to measure the fading of the euphoria effect and communist 
compulsory voting, is accounted for by the election sequence variable. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 Looking at the directions of the coefficients for the interactions in Table 1, three factors 
produce the expected results. As expected the interaction between election sequence and 
education is positive, which would indicate that with time turnout inequality increases. The 
main effect for election sequence is negative indicating that overall turnout fell with each 
subsequent democratic election. The results of Model 1 indicate that the time effect remains 
robust even when changes in the party system and electoral institutions are accounted for: none 
of the other factors explain away the coefficient for the interaction between election sequence 
and education.  
  These effects would appear to fit with the ‘founding elections’ euphoria explanation. 
The low socioeconomic status voters, who are most sensitive to the costs of voting, drop out 
more quickly than the high status voters, as the initial excitement with democratic elections 
fades and no longer counter-balances the costs of voting. Alternatively, turnout inequality 
could increase as the older cohorts are replaced by younger ones who came of age too late to 
experience compulsory voting in communist elections. The analysis in the next section will 
adjudicate between these two possibilities by determining whether turnout inequality increased 
because older voters stopped voting as they reassessed their faith in elections, or because of the 
entrance of the new post-transition generation for whom voting was voluntary. 
Also as expected, trade union membership reduces the impact of education. 
Additionally the main effect of trade union membership is positive. The two effects for trade 
union membership indicate that, as expected, trade union membership boosts turnout among 
the disadvantaged voters, thus equalizing turnout.  
Finally, as expected, ballot complexity increases the impact of education. In systems 
with preferential voting, turnout inequality is higher than in the simpler closed list PR or mixed 
majoritarian-PR systems. That ballot complexity appears to discourage disadvantaged voters 
suggests that voters in Eastern Europe react to changes in the cost of voting in the same ways 
as voters in established democracies.  
 The remaining factors do not have the effects expected based on the experience of 
established democracies. Overall party supply seems to have no effect on turnout inequality 
and it may even encourage voters in Eastern Europe contrary to expectations. Polarization also 
has no effect on the impact of education on turnout; the dispersion of political parties on the 
left-right spectrum seems to have no influence on turnout inequality. Polarization encourages 
voters to rely on ideology to make electoral choices rather than party identification (Dalton and 
Anderson in Dalton 2010). In new democracies in Eastern Europe where party identification is 
weak and voter volatility high (Tavits 2008), voters already have to rely on ideology, so for 
this reason a variety of party positions may not significantly discourage voters.   
The number of parties reduces the effect of education contrary to expectations. The 
equalizing effect of the number of parties is not robust, however, as it is driven largely by early 
elections in Russia and Ukraine. The third election in Ukraine, which took place in 1998, is a 
particularly extreme outlier in terms of the number of parties, so when it is excluded the 
effective number of parties has no effect on turnout inequality. The early elections in Russia 
and especially Ukraine were unusually chaotic with not only a high number of parties running 
for office but also numerous independent candidates. The first few parliamentary elections in 
Ukraine were some of the most extreme cases of party fractionalization among electoral 
democracies (Moser 1999; Moser and Scheiner 2004). The high level of fractionalization in 
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Ukraine is perhaps best considered as an indication of the extreme weakness of party 
institutionalization rather than an abundance of meaningful electoral choice.  
 Left party strength does not have the equalizing effect expected: the vote share of left 
parties appears to increase the effect of education, but a closer examination of the marginal 
effects of education shows that left party strength has no significant effect on turnout inequality 
as shown in Figure 5. In the post-communist left parties do not necessarily offer the pro-welfare 
policies that encourage poor voters to vote. During the transition, left parties had stronger 
incentives to pursue austerity and anti-welfare policies than right parties in order to prove their 
disassociation with socialism (Tavits and Letki 2009). By pursuing more ‘right-wing’ policies 
than right wing parties themselves, the left parties could not play the anticipated role in 
mobilizing the low socioeconomic status voters who were often ‘losers’ in the economic 
transition. While none of the second level country-election units is an influential outlier, the 
results are driven in part by Hungary and Poland. These two countries are considered one of 
the most successful cases of market reform, and in these countries, left parties were particularly 
eager to sever associations with communism (Tavits and Letki 2009).  
 Finally, income inequality reduces the effect of education, also contrary to expectations. 
In established democracies, income inequality increases turnout inequality by discouraging 
poor voters who feel powerless to influence politics (Solt 2008, 2012; Anderson and Beramendi 
2008). In post-communist new democracies, on the other hand, income inequality appears to 
reduce turnout particularly among the best-informed voters. These results suggest that voters 
in Eastern Europe perceive the implications of inequality differently; owing to past 
commitments to egalitarianism under communism, Eastern Europeans are far more 
disapproving of income inequality than Western Europeans (Corneo and Gruner 2000). Income 
inequality may be linked to the legitimacy of the new regimes. Inequality is highest in the 
former Soviet Union where the democratic transitions stalled, and economies suffer from elite 
capture. The best-informed voters will be most aware of the flawed economic and political 
transitions, and to them inequality may be evidence of the lack of legitimacy of a new political 
system and the futility of voting.  
 To aid the interpretation of the logit results in substantive terms I show the predicted 
probabilities of voting by education depending on the different levels of the explanatory 
variable following Gallego’s example (2010) in Figures 3 to 6. The effective number of parties 
and income inequality have the greatest effects on turnout inequality. In countries with the 
highest number of parties, the gap in turnout between the best and least educated is about 15 
percent, but when the number of parties is lowest the gap is only 2 percent. The gap in turnout 
between the best and least educated voters is 20 percent in the most equal countries, while in 
the most unequal post-communist countries, such as Russia, the gap is only 4 percent. Whereas 
with time, turnout inequality increased from 10 percent to 20. Ballot complexity increases 
turnout inequality from about 6 percent to 12. 
[Insert Figures 3, 4, 5, 6 about here] 
Fading effects of euphoria or compulsory voting? 
The findings thus far clearly indicate that turnout inequality has increased with time in post-
communist countries. However, to distinguish between the two possible explanations, we must 
look at trends in turnout inequality in terms of meaningfully defined generations of voters.6 If 
                                                             
6 Three generations: The post-Cold War generation consists of people who were in their ‘impressionable’ years 
after 1989, in other words they would have been aged 14 or younger in 1989. The Cold War generation 
consists of people who were in their impressionable years (aged 15-25) between 1945 and 1989. The pre-Cold 
War generation consists of people who came of age before 1945. This cohort is particularly relevant in Warsaw 
Pact countries where communism was imposed only in 1945, which means that this cohort came of age before 
being required to vote in communist elections.  
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the fading effect of communist compulsory voting is responsible for the increase in turnout 
inequality, we would expect turnout inequality in the overall population through two processes. 
The replacement of the older generations, particularly the Cold War cohort, by the post-Cold 
War cohort, which never experienced communist elections, should be the primary process. The 
Cold War cohort is expected to be the most likely generation to have formed a habit of voting 
through forced participation in communist elections, since this generation would have 
experienced communist elections in their formative or ‘impressionable’ years (Alwin et al. 
1991); generally experiences during these years are most likely to have persistent effects 
throughout adulthood (Prior 2010). Secondly, we would expect turnout inequality to increase 
slightly among the pre-Cold War cohort from the Warsaw Pact countries, which came of age 
before communism regimes were imposed in 1945 and thus never completely formed a habit 
of voting. On the other hand, if the excitement of the transition temporarily mobilized voters, 
we would see strong evidence of behavioural change among mature cohorts. We would expect 
to see turnout inequality increase among both the pre-Cold War and Cold War generations as 
both these generations of voters lose their excitement about voting. We would also expect to 
see some generational replacement effects, since the post-Cold War cohort would have come 
of age after the excitement of the transition. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 Table 2 shows how the change in turnout inequality over time differs by generation. 
For comparison, Model 1 shows the results of a model with all cohorts while accounting for 
the other main determinants of turnout inequality, as established in the previous section (e.g. 
ballot complexity, income inequality, and trade union membership). To clarify the extent of 
the change over time in turnout inequality, elections are treated as dummy variables. Once the 
post-Cold War cohort is removed from the sample, turnout inequality still increased among the 
older generations of voters particularly in the fourth and fifth elections as shown by the positive 
and statistically significant coefficients for the interactions between elections and education in 
Model 2. A comparison of the predicted turnout inequality for all cohorts and just the two older 
ones shows that most of the turnout inequality is among the two older generations: for all 
generations taken together, the university educated were more likely to vote than the 
uneducated by 21 percent in the 4th election, by 18 percent in the 5th election and by 14 percent 
in 6th election, but if the post-Cold War generation is removed from the sample the differences 
are only reduced to 19, 15, and 10 percent respectively.7 Therefore generational replacement 
contributed only a small proportion of the turnout inequality over time.  
Next the two older generations are further broken down into the Cold War generation 
and the pre-Cold War generation in Warsaw Pact countries where communist regimes were not 
imposed until 1945; the pre-Cold War generation in the Warsaw Pact countries would have 
come of age before the requirement to vote in communist elections. The separate analysis for 
these two generations (Models 3 and 4) shows that turnout inequality primarily increased in 
the Cold War generation, a finding which runs contrary to the expectation that compulsory 
voting under communism had strong habit forming effects.  
These findings suggest that the abolishing of compulsory voting is not the primary 
explanation; most likely both the fading effects of excitement of the transition and the de facto 
compulsory voting are behind the increase in turnout inequality. Furthermore the results 
suggest that both learning and generational replacement underlie the changes in voter turnout. 
That uneducated citizens, particularly among the Cold War generation, are clearly losing 
interest in voting reflects the decline in perceived benefits of voting as the initial excitement 
about democracy fades. However, the entrance into the electorate of the post-Cold War cohort, 
                                                             
7 The predicted probabilities of voting for all cohorts are based on Model 1 in Table 2, and predicted 
probabilities for the two older cohorts are based on Model 2. 
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which came of age in the mid-1990s after the excitement of the transition had waned and which 
never experienced communist mobilization of voters, has also clearly contributed to the 
increase in turnout inequality. Further analysis of cohort patterns in turnout over a longer period 
is needed to exactly determine how much these two explanations contributed to the change in 
turnout; a longer period of analysis that stretches beyond the period affected by excitement of 
the transition will better capture any traces of the habituating effects of communist compulsory 
voting.    
  
Conclusions 
This study examined turnout inequality in the context of Eastern European new democracies. 
Despite the supposed social levelling effects of communism, all these countries display turnout 
inequality and in quite varied levels. The results of this study show that while some accepted 
institutional explanations, particularly ballot complexity, help explain turnout inequality in 
Eastern European new democracies, the dynamic transitional context has to be taken into 
consideration. In Eastern Europe, turnout inequality is strongly shaped by processes related to 
the regime change and democratic consolidation, particularly the fading excitement of the 
democratic transition.  
 As in established democracies, ballot complexity increases turnout inequality as less 
informed voters are dissuaded from voting by the required electoral choices. Also, perhaps 
surprisingly for some readers, trade unions seem to play the same role in mobilizing 
disadvantaged voters in Eastern Europe as they used to in Western Europe before unions started 
focusing on white-collar workers (Leighley and Nagler 2007). These findings are consistent 
with Bernhagen and Marsh’s study, which shows that trade union membership has similar 
effects on turnout in both Eastern and Western Europe (2007). Furthermore, this conclusion is 
consistent with Letki’s finding that compulsory membership in non-democratic organizations 
did actually have the lasting effect of encouraging political participation after the collapse of 
communism (2004).  
 On the other hand, left party strength, party supply, and income inequality play a very 
different role in Eastern Europe with regards to turnout inequality. Left parties in Eastern 
Europe do not play the traditional role of mobilizing the working class and thus left parties do 
not have an equalizing effect on turnout. Left parties in Eastern Europe had strong incentives 
to pursue austerity and pro-market policies to disprove any associations with the discredited 
communist ideology (Tavits and Letki 2009). The pressure to prove their commitment to the 
new democratic system and capitalism outweighed the benefits of appealing to voters harmed 
by the economic transition. In contrast to established democracies, an abundance of electoral 
choices at the very least does not deter disadvantaged voters, and a high number of parties to 
choose from may even encourage them to vote. Possibly, in the absence of party identities, all 
voters in Eastern Europe choose parties more by ideology regardless of their cognitive abilities, 
so they need plenty to choose from.  
A perhaps worrying finding pertains to effects of income inequality on voter turnout. 
People in Eastern Europe clearly seem to react differently to income inequality than in 
established democracies. In established democracies, income inequality appears to reinforce 
feelings of relative powerlessness among poor voters (Solt 2008; Anderson and Beramendi 
2008). In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, socially and economically advantaged voters, who 
were best rewarded in the economic transition, seem most discouraged by income inequality 
from participating in democratic politics. This finding suggests that the advantaged voters, who 
are the best informed and most perceptive, may be aware of the flaws of the economic and 
political transition in particular how elites were allowed to capture resources.  
 Finally, consistent with the argument that transitional processes shaped turnout 
inequality in Eastern Europe, the fading of the initial excitement with democratic elections 
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appears to be the primary cause of the increasing turnout inequality. In the first few democratic 
elections, turnout was very high as people placed great hope in the new democratic system. 
With each subsequent election, however, the perceived benefits of participating in elections 
declined as people realized that democracy is not a panacea for all problems (Kostadinova 
2003). With the decline in perceived benefits, low socioeconomic status people who are most 
sensitive to the costs of voting have dropped out of the electorate resulting in a growth in 
turnout inequality over time. This process has been principally one of learning among the older 
generation of voters; the replacement of the older voters by the post-Cold War, post-transition, 
generation only slightly contributed to the process. While this process of disillusionment with 
democracy is unfortunate for the equal political representation of different socioeconomic 
groups, it is an inevitable ‘normalization’ of voting behaviour in new democracies as people 
develop more realistic expectations of the political system. 
 
16 
REFERENCES 
Abrams, Samuel, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2011. "Informal Social Networks and Rational 
Voting." British Journal of Political Science 41 (02): 229.  
Alwin, D. F., Cohen, R. L., & Newcomb, T. M. (1991). Political attitudes over the life span: The 
Bennington Study. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
André, Blais 1947 and André Blais 1947-. 2000. To Vote Or Not to Vote? : The Merits and Limits of 
Rational Choice Theory. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press.  
Anduiza Perea, Eva. 2002. "Individual Characteristics, Institutional Incentives and Electoral 
Abstention in Western Europe." European Journal of Political Research 41 (5): 643-673.  
Beramendi, Pablo and Christopher Anderson. 2008. Democracy, Inequality, and Representation: A 
Comparative Perspective. New York, N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation.  
Bernhagen, Patrick and Michael Marsh. 2007. "Voting and Protesting: Explaining Citizen 
Participation in Old and New European Democracies." Democratization 14 (1): 44.  
Blais , Andre and Agnieszka Dobrzynska. 1998. "Turnout in Electoral Democracies." European 
Journal of Political Research 33 (2): 239-261.  
Blais, André. 2006. "What Affects Voter Turnout?" Annual Review of Political Science 9 (1): 111-
125.  
Calvert, Jerry W. and Jack Gilchrist. 1993. "Suppose they Held an Election and almost Everybody 
Came!" PS: Political Science and Politics 26 (4): 695-700.  
Caul Kittilson, Miki and Christopher J. Anderson. 2010. "Electoral Supply and Voter Turnout." In 
Citizens, Context, and Choice: How Context Shapes Citizens' Electoral Choices, edited by 
Russell J. Dalton and Christopher J. Anderson. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
Corneo, Giacomo and Hans Peter Grüner. 2002. "Individual Preferences for Political Redistribution." 
Journal of Public Economics 83 (1): 83-107.  
Dalton, Russell J. 2008. "The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems: Party System Polarization, 
its Measurement, and its Consequences." Comparative Political Studies 41 (7): 899-920.  
Delaney, John, Thomas Masters, and Susan Schwochau. 1988. "Unionism and Voter Turnout." 
Journal of Labor Research 9 (3): 221-236.  
Ekiert, G., & Kubik, J. (1998). Contentious politics in new democracies. World Politics, 
50(4):547_581. 
Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 1995. "The Politics and Economics of Democratic 
Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies." British Journal of Political 
Science 25: 485-514.  
Fornos, Carolina , Timothy Power, and James Garand. 2004. "Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin 
America, 1980 to 2000." Comparative Political Studies 37 (8): 909-940.  
Furtak, R. K. (Ed.). (1990). Elections in socialist states. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Franklin, M. N. (2004). Voter turnout and the dynamics of electoral competition in established 
democracies since 1945. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Gallego, Aina. 2010. "Understanding Unequal Turnout: Education and Voting in Comparative 
Perspective." Electoral Studies 29 (2): 239-248.  
———. 2007. "Unequal Political Participation in Europe." International Journal of Sociology 37 
(4): 10-25.  
Glenn, J. K. (2003). Contentious politics and democratization: Comparing the impact of social 
movements on the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. Political Studies, 51(1), 103-120. 
Goodin, Robert and John Dryzek. 1980. "Rational Participation: The Politics of Relative Power." 
British Journal of Political Science 10 (03): 273.  
Gray, Mark and Miki Caul. 2000. "Declining Voter Turnout in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 
1950 to 1997." Comparative Political Studies 33 (9): 1091-1122.  
17 
Hughes, Sallie and Manuel Alejandro Guerrero. 2009. "The Disenchanted Voter: Emotional 
Attachment, Social Stratification, and Mediated Politics in Mexico's 2006 Presidential Election." 
The International Journal of Press/Politics 14 (3): 353-375.  
Hutcheson, Derek. 2004. "Disengaged Or Disenchanted? The Vote ‘against all’ in Post-Communist 
Russia." Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 20(1):98-121.  
Inglehart, Ronald and Gabriela Catterberg. 2002. "Trends in Political Action: The Developmental 
Trend and the Post-Honeymoon Decline." International Journal of Comparative Sociology 43 
(3-5): 300-316. 
Jackman, Robert. 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." The 
American Political Science Review 81 (2): 405-424.  
Jusko, Karen Long and W. Phillips Shively. 2005. "Applying a Two-Step Strategy to the Analysis of 
Cross-National Public Opinion Data." Political Analysis 13: 327-344.  
Karklins, R. (1986). Soviet elections revisited: Voter abstention in noncompetitive voting. The 
American Political Science Review, 449-470. 
Karp, Jeffrey and Susan Banducci. 2007. "Party Mobilization and Political Participation in New and 
Old Democracies." Party Politics 13 (2): 217-234.  
Karp, Jeffrey and Susan Banducci. 2008. "Political Efficacy and Participation in Twenty-Seven 
Democracies: How Electoral Systems Shape Political Behaviour." British Journal of Political 
Science 38 (02): 311.  
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, AndreaVolkens, Judith Bara, Ian Budge, and Michael D. McDonald. 
2006. Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in 
Eastern Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990–2003. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kluegel, James and David Mason. 2004. "Fairness Matters: Social Justice and Political Legitimacy 
in Post-Communist Europe." Europe-Asia Studies 56 (6): 813-834.  
Kostadinova, Tatiana. 2003. "Voter Turnout Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe." European 
Journal of Political Research 42 (6): 741-759.  
Kostadinova, Tatiana and Timothy Power. 2007. "Does Democratization Depress Participation? 
Voter Turnout in the Latin American and Eastern European Transitional Democracies." Political 
Research Quarterly 60 (3): 363-377.  
Kostelka, Filip. "The State of Political Participation in Post-Communist Democracies: Low but 
Surprisingly Little Biased Citizen Engagement." Europe-Asia Studies ahead-of-print (2014): 1-
24. 
Laakso, Marrku and Lein Taagpera. 1979. " The 'Effective' Number of Parties: A Measure with 
Application to Western Europe " Comparative Political Studies 12 (1): 3-27.  
Leighley, Jan E. and Jonathan Nagler. 1992. "Who Votes?" Journal of Politics 54 (3): 718-740.  
Leighley, Jan E. and Jonathan Nagler. 2007. "Unions, Voter Turnout, and Class Bias in the U.S. 
Electorate, 1964–2004." The Journal of Politics 69 (02): 430.  
Leighley, J. E., & Nagler, J. (2013). Who Votes Now? Demographics, Issues, Inequality, and Turnout 
in the United States. Princeton University Press. 
Letki, Natalia. 2004. "Socialization for Participation? Trust, Membership, and Democratization in 
East-Central Europe." Political Research Quarterly 57 (4): 665-679.  
Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma." The American 
Political Science Review 91 (1): 1-14.  
Lipset, Seymour Martin., and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-
National Perspectives. New York: Free Press.  
Mahler, V. A. (2008). Electoral turnout and income redistribution by the state: A cross‐national 
analysis of the developed democracies. European Journal of Political Research, 47(2), 161-183. 
Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. "Generation, age, and time: The dynamics of political learning 
during Russia's transformation." American Journal of Political Science 51.4 (2007): 822-834. 
18 
Neundorf, Anja. 2010. "Democracy in Transition: A Micro Perspective on System Change in Post-
Socialist Societies." The Journal of Politics 72 (04): 1096.  
Norris, Pippa. 2002. Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. London: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
Pacek, Alexander, Grigore Pop-Eleches, and Joshua Tucker. 2009. "Disenchanted or Discerning: 
Voter Turnout in Post-Communist Countries." The Journal of Politics 71 (02): 473-491. 
Pop-Eleches, Grigore, and Joshua A. Tucker. (2014) "Communist socialization and post-communist 
economic and political attitudes." Electoral Studies 33: 77-89. 
Radcliff, Benjamin. 2001. "Organized Labor and Electoral Participation in American National 
Elections." Journal of Labor Research 22 (2): 405-414.  
Radcliff, Benjamin and Patricia David. 2000. "Labor Organization and Electoral Participation in 
Industrial Democracies." American Journal of Political Science 44 (1): 132-141.  
Rolfe, Meredith. 2012. Voter Turnout. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
Rosenstone, Steven and John Mark Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in 
America. Oxford: Maxwell Macmillan International.  
Roussias, Nassos. 2012. "Turnout in Early Elections of New Democracies: The Effects of Pre-
Democratic Experiences and Party System Evolution." EPOP, Oxford, UK.  
Sakwa, George, and Martin Crouch. 1978. "Sejm Elections in Communist Poland: An Overview and 
a Reappraisal." British Journal of Political Science 8(4): 403-424. 
Sartori, Giovanni, 1976. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Schattschneider, Elmer E. 1960. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in 
America. New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston.  
Schmitt, Hermann and Andre Freire. 2012. "Ideological Polarization: Different Worlds in East and 
West." In Citizen and the European Polity: Mass Attitudes towards the European and National 
Polities, edited by David Sanders, Pedro Magalhaes and Gabor Toka. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press.  
Solt, Frederick. 2010. "Does Economic Inequality Depress Electoral Participation? Testing the 
Schattschneider Hypothesis." Political Behavior 32 (2): 285-301.  
———. 2009. "Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database." Social Science Quarterly 90 
(2): 231-242.  
Tavits, Margit. 2008. "On the Linkage between Electoral Volatility and Party System Instability in 
Central and Eastern Europe." European Journal of Political Research 47 (5): 537-555.  
Tavits, Margit and Natalia Letki. 2009. "When Left is Right: Party Ideology and Policy in Post-
Communist Europe." American Political Science Review 103 (04): 555.  
Tingsten, Herbert. 1937. Political Behavior. Studies in Election Statistics. (The Translation by Vilgot 
Hammarling.). London: P.S. King & Son.  
Topf, Richard. 1995. "Electoral Participation." In Citizens and the State, edited by Hans-Dieter 
Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Tucker, Joshua. 2006. Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the 
Czech Republic, 1990-1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Ulfelder, J. (2004) Baltic protest in the Gorbachev Era: Movement content and dynamics, Global 
Review of Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics 3 (3-4): 23-43 
Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic 
Voluntarism in American Politics. London: Harvard University Press.  
Verba, Sidney and Norman H. Nie. 1972. Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social 
Equality. London: Harper & Row.  
19 
Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim. 1978. Participation and Political Equality: A 
Seven-Nation Comparison, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
White, S. and I. McAllister. 2004. "Dimensions of Disengagement in Post-Communist Russia." The 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 2 (1): 81-97.  
Wolfinger, Raymond E. and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. Who Votes?. London: Yale University 
Press.  
Zaslavsky,  Victor and Robert J. Brym (1978) The functions of elections in the USSR, Soviet Studies 
30(3): 362-371 
 
20 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Turnout Inequality over Turnout (survey estimated) 
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Figure 2: Turnout and Turnout Inequality by Election Sequence 
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Table 1: Determinants of Turnout Inequality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Election -0.230** -0.125 -0.122 -0.121 -0.126 -0.124  -0.142*  
(0.070) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)  (0.065) 
Education 0.171*** 0.478*** 0.670*** 0.280*** 1.291*** 0.094*  0.441*** 
 (0.042) (0.030) (0.025) (0.035) (0.074) (0.038)  (0.013)    
Trade Union 0.309*** 0.302*** 0.311*** 0.303*** 0.309*** 0.309*** 0.488***  
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.077)    
Polarization -0.025 -0.008 -0.027 -0.025 -0.030 -0.027  0.006     
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043)  (0.042)    
ENEP -0.023 -0.023 0.045 -0.024 -0.022 -0.022  -0.038     
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)  (0.030)    
Left Vote Share 0.036 -0.011 0.026 -0.476 -0.020 -0.016  -0.145     
(0.423) (0.425) (0.425) (0.439) (0.432) (0.429)  (0.397)    
Ballot -0.423*** -0.417*** -0.422*** -0.418*** -0.417*** -0.678*** -0.769***  
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.108) (0.111)  (0.166)    
Income Inequality -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 0.033* -0.014  -0.023     
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.014)    
Age 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.130***  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)    
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)    
ElectionXEduc. 0.060*** 
     
  
(0.009) 
     
 
PolarizatonXEduc.  -0.010 
    
  
 (0.005) 
    
 
ENEPXEduc 
 
 -0.037*** 
   
   
 (0.003) 
   
 
LeftVoteXEduc. 
 
  0.262*** 
  
   
  (0.057) 
  
 
InequalityXEduc. 
    
-0.026*** 
 
      
(0.002) 
 
 
BallotXEduc 
  
 
  
0.149***     
 
  
(0.016)   
TradeUnionXEduc.       -0.094*   
       (0.037)    
Constant -0.619 -1.137* -1.492** -0.815 -2.542*** -0.453  -1.321*    
(0.577) (0.577) (0.576) (0.580) (0.597) (0.584)  (0.532)    
Survey Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random Intercept L3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random Intercept L2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 
      
 
BIC 103890.2 103929.4 103808.5 103911.5 103790.2 103843.6  103910.5   
Individuals 98116 98116 98116 98116 98116 98116  98116    
Country-elections 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
* p<0.01, *** p<0.001   The coefficients are estimated using a hierarchical random intercept logit regression model. The 
dependent variables is turnout. 
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Figure 3: Probability of Voting by Education and Election Sequence 
 
 
Figure 4: Predicted Probability of Voting By Education and Ballot complexity 
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Figure 5: Predicted Probability of Voting by Left Party Strength 
 
 
Figure 6: Predicted Probability of Voting by Education and Income Inequality 
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Table 2: Change in turnout inequality by generation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All cohorts Pre-Cold War & Cold War Pre-Cold War (non-USSR) Cold War 
     
2nd election (ref.) - - - - 
     
3rd election -0.144 -0.260 -0.363 -0.183 
 (0.243) (0.251) (0.373) (0.266) 
4th election 
 
-1.087*** 
 
-1.145*** -0.886* -1.009*** 
 (0.242) (0.250) (0.420) (0.267) 
5th election -0.724** -0.674** -0.538 -0.733** 
 (0.240) (0.248) (0.402) (0.264) 
6th election -0.498* -0.445 0.081 -0.548* 
 (0.237) (0.246) (0.409) (0.262) 
Education 
 
0.757*** 0.627*** 1.373*** 0.401** 
 (0.086) (0.099) (0.415) (0.123) 
2nd election X Educ. (ref.) - - - - 
     
3rd election X Educ. 0.067 0.086 0.156 0.042 
 (0.042) (0.046) (0.152) (0.057) 
4th election X Educ. 0.281*** 0.230*** 0.335 0.198** 
 (0.043) (0.049) (0.183) (0.061) 
5th election X Educ. 0.261*** 0.184*** 0.367* 0.211*** 
 (0.039) (0.045) (0.158) (0.057) 
6th  election X Educ. 0.105** 0.009 -0.039 0.034 
 (0.039) (0.046) (0.173) (0.056) 
Ballot X Educ. 
 
0.183*** 0.152*** -0.042 0.207*** 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.121) (0.035) 
Trade union X Educ. -0.013 0.013 0.048 0.052 
 (0.035) (0.041) (0.215) (0.046) 
Inequality X Educ. 
 
- 
0.017*** 
-0.012*** -0.032* -0.007* 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) 
Trade union 
 
0.347*** 0.311*** 0.356 0.202* 
 (0.074) (0.085) (0.372) (0.096) 
Ballot 
 
-1.066*** 
 
-1.028*** -0.765** -1.162*** 
 (0.153) (0.158) (0.244) (0.166) 
Income inequality -0.007 -0.015 -0.020 -0.030* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.014) 
Survey effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random Intercept-Country-election Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BIC 111934.2 80202.67 7853.189 55710.31 
Individuals 104532 79081 7401 55540 
Country-elections 46 46 46 46 
     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 The dependent variable is turnout. The table displays coefficients for a two-level multilevel 
model with random intercepts for the country-election. All regression include unreported dummies for survey. The 2nd election is 
the reference category 
 
